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Alberto Jiménez de 
Lucio* 
Technological developments in transport and com-
munications have made possible the centrally-man-
aged internationalization of production and market-
ing oí goods and services: a system which increas-
ingly dominates the international economic scene. 
This internationalization across borders has been 
accompanied by internalization within corporate 
boundaries: a significant portion of international 
trade is today intra-firm trade, between branches of a 
single large corporation. 
First to exploit the advantages of this mode of 
production and marketing were the transnational 
corporations based in the developed market econo-
my countries (the 'West'), which operated freely in 
the West and South but not at all in the centrally-
planned economies ot the East. The economic im-
portance of these enteiprises has given rise to many 
studies which describe their approaches and forms 
of operation. Much less is known, however, oí the 
processes whereby the socialist countries and deve-
loping countries, each in their own way, have also 
recently started to internationalize their production 
and marketing. In so doing, the East has somewhat 
opened up to transnational corporations, while the 
South has created some competition to these, and in 
this sense has closed slightly to their influence, al-
though overall their presence has not diminished. 
Considerable empirical research is needed to ascer-
tain the exact dimension of these developments, but 
enough is known to formulate at least some sugges-
tions to developing countries which might be useful 
in charting their policies, To this end, the present 
article surveys recent developments in the East and 
South, and then seeks to draw some significant con-
clusions. 




Efforts in the East to internationalize the pro-
duction and marketing of goods and services 
have given rise to a number of activities of 
socialist ventures in the markets of the West 
and to the creation of international enterprise 
organizations (IEOs) and socialist joint enter-
prises (SJEs). In the process, various modali-
ties of East-West industrial co-operation have 
been developed, including tripartite arrange-
ments with countries in the South. 
Very recent data are not available on so-
cialist ventures in the markets of the West, but 
312 such ventures with US$ 603 million in fi-
xed assets were identified as of November 
1977.l The leading home countries were the 
USSR (84 ventures), Poland (65) and Hungary 
(58), while the leading host countries were the 
Federal Republic of Germany (54), the United 
Kingdom (48) and France (42). The principal 
activities of the ventures were marketing (159 
ventures with US$ 40 million in fixed assets), 
marketing and distribution (19 with, US$ 57 
million), marketing and services (31 with US$ 
62 million), financial services (23 with US$ 340 
million) and transport services (39 with US$ 14 
million). Only 8 ventures (with assets of US$ 36 
million) did assembly or manufacturing in ad-
dition to marketing, and only 5 (with assets of 
US$ 25 million) were involved to the extraction 
and processing of raw materials. 
International enterprise organizations 
(IEOs) are at present the major form of enter-
prise-level integration of the socialist coun-
tries. They are set up by independent enterpri-
ses of a specific industry, or subsidiaries, or 
even enterprises with a specific product line. 
They can include research institutions and 
even administrative divisions of an industry 
ministry. Their objectives are to promote co-
operation and integration in specific industries 
among socialist countries, and to carry out com-
mon activities in research, production services 
and trade. The first IEO was established in 
shipping in 1970, and by 1976 there were five 
l Uni ted Nations, Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions, Transnational Corporations inWorld Development: 
A Re-examination, New York, 1978. See tables III-70 and 
III-71. 
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IEOs in operation. They operate as rather loose 
associations of independent partners who ex-
change information about market conditions, 
research accomplishments and production 
goals. 
Socialist joint enterprises (SJEs), on the 
other hand, are jointly-owned companies with 
participants from two or more socialist coun-
tries. The first SJE, "Haldex", was established 
in 1959 by Poland and Hungary, to apply Hun-
garian technology to the processing of waste 
from coal-mine dumps in Poland. By 1976, five 
SJEs were in operation: three in mining and 
mineral processing, one in transportation and 
one in manufacturing (textiles);2 since then, a 
sixth enterprise, in transportation, has been es-
tablished. The textile enterprise "Friendship", 
set up by Poland and the German Democratic 
Republ ic in 1972, is the only one in the consu-
mer goods area. Five of the six are bilateral and 
one is multilateral. The latter, established in 
1978 by an intergovernmental agreement bet-
ween Bulgaria, Hungary, the USSR and Cze-
choslovakia, is called "Interlichter", and it 
transports goods between the ports on the Da-
nube and those on the Black Sea and the Medi-
terranean. 
SJEs act as independent corporations 
which control and manage the assets contrib-
uted by their members; they are jointly man-
aged organizations whose participants share in 
lhe profits or other forms of appreciation of the 
resources invested. They have a varied sphere 
of activity, contributing in particular to close 
co-operation and specialization in production 
activities, particularly in the services, chemical 
and engineering industries and in the extrac-
tion and preliminary processing of raw mate-
rials. The important feature is that they partici-
pate in the development and integration of 
their member countries and are able to function 
in a sustained and efficient manner. 
A typical example of a successful SJE is 
"Haldex" , mentioned earlier, which between 
1970 and 1980 produced 3.1 million tons of coal 
by processing waste.3 Except for the first two 
2D.A. Arnold, International Economic Organizations 
of Socialist Countries Economic Co-operation among 
CMEA Member Countries, Vol. I, 1976, p. 95. 
;iVrati.slavViilek, "Joint Enterprises of'CMEA Member 
States", Nedelna Fravila, 29 February 1980, p. 5. 
years, the company has worked at a profit. It 
now has seven plants and employs over 1 000 
workers. The Hungarian patent is being used 
in the United Kingdom, Belgium and Turkey, 
and many countries (including the USSR and 
the USA) have sent samples of their coal-mine 
wastes to "Haldex" to determine if its technol-
ogy is applicable. 
Socialist joint enterprises seem likely to 
assume increased functions and responsibili-
ties in the coming years. They can offer bigger 
and more varied supply and are able to use 
large-scale marketing strategies and specific 
trademarks: all this makes for competitiveness 
in the West and constitutes an additional incen-
tive for the creation of more SJEs. For instance, 
one of the objectives of "Erdenet", established 
by the USSR and Mongolia in 1973 for the joint 
extraction of copper and other minerals, was to 
provide better access to Western markets for 
Mongolian products. Up to the present time, 
however, exports of SJEs to the West have been 
marginal. 
Still, no SJEs are set up exclusively to ex-
port to the West, the specialization and division 
of labour in the socialist countries being the 
primary consideration in their establishment. 
With the State as sole owner, investment funds 
can always be optimally allocated for econo-
mies of scale, and the lesser gravitation of SJEs, 
as compared to transnational corporations in 
the West, is not due to lack of interest or lower 
level of economic development, but to the fact 
that in the centrally-planned economies similar 
advantages can be derived from alternatives 
less integrated types of international economic 
co-operation.4 
The establishment of SJEs, despite these 
advantages, faces a number of practical difficul-
ties arising from the different laws and systems 
in the various countries as to legal status, ac-
counting, control measures and determination 
of efficiency and profits. This is why SJEs al-
most always start as bilateral undertakings. 
Given the diversified needs and resources of 
the participating countries, fuller integration 
will require the abandonment of a perfectly 
4Leon Znrawicki, Multinational Enterprises in the 
West and the East, Sijtihoff and Nooi'dhoii, the Netherlands, 
1979. 
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symmetrical structure of the SJE and the insti-
tution of a system of unequal shares.5 
Let us now turn to East-West industrial 
co-operation. This represents the most signifi-
cant opening of the East to the internationaliza-
tion of the production and marketing of goods 
and services, and it has expanded both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively during the last de-
cade: the size of the projects has increased, and 
new and more complex forms of operation 
—such as joint ventures— have been utilized. 
Perceived mutual benefits account for this ex-
pansion. The East seeks increased technology 
inflows, foreign exchange and access to West-
ern markets, while Western enterprises seek 
new markets, trained manpower and lower 
production costs. Both seek to benefit from the 
advantages in efficiency resulting from the in-
ternationalization of research, production and 
marketing, in a manner compatible with their 
different economic and social systems. 
Industrial co-operation has taken four 
main forms:6 supply of plants and equipment, 
with payment in the resultant products; co-ope-
ration in production and marketing; project co-
operation, and joint ventures. 
T h e supply of plants and equipment usual-
ly involves complete plants and related ser-
vices, to be paid for in products made by the 
plants or raw materials extracted with the help 
of the equipment. Related services may inclu-
de assembling the plants and putting them into 
operation, as well as training of personnel. Co-
operation may also include exchange of in-
formation, joint research and joint marketing. 
Such co-operation is also in the interest of the 
supplier, who is going to be paid with the prod-
ucts of the plant. 
A 1977 survey showed that although only 
20% of industrial co-operation contracts were 
of this type, many were large-scale, long-term 
compensation agreements which in value 
terms exceeded 80% of the total industrial co-
operation for several countries. Such agree-
ments offer economic advantages to both par-
ties much beyond the traditional types of barter 
sibid. 
6 Economic Commission for Europe, Joint UNCTC/ 
E C E Unit, East-West Industrial Co-operation (United Na-
tions Publication, Sales No. E. 79. IO. E. 25, New York, 
1979). 
agreement. To the East, they provide stable 
contract terms (5-10 years normally, even up to 
20 in some cases) that fit in well with 5-year 
plans and long-term programmes of economic 
development; furthermore, they often provide 
Eastern firms with extra-industrial capacity 
which increases their export potential. To the 
West, they open new export prospects and as-
sure long-term supplies of raw materials and 
energy for productive activities. 
The first industrial co-operation agree-
ment was signed in 1968 and provided for the 
supply of Soviet natural gas to Austria in ex-
change for Austrian steel pipes, equipment, 
and the construction of a gas pipeline in the 
USSR. The second was signed in 1969 and pro-
vided for the USSR to by forestry equipment 
from Japan and pay for it with forest products. 
Agreements similar to the one with Austria 
were later signed with Italy, France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Later agree-
ments include the construction of processing 
plants (sulphur, caustic soda, potassium, ni-
trates, fertilizers, petrochemicals, etc.) and mi-
neral complexes (iron, steel, aluminium, cop-
per), and involve the majority of the socialist 
countries and of the industrial countries of the 
West. Recent statistics show that the total value 
of this type of contracts signed between 1968 
and 1978 amounted to US$ 16 750 million. The 
main areas of co-operation were chemical pro-
ducts (US$ 8 000 million), gas (US$ 3 500 mil-
lion) ferrous metals (US$ 2 500 million) coal 
(US$ 1 250 million) and timber and wood pulp 
(US$ 750 million).7 An itemized listing of trans-
actions of this type between the East and the 
West can be found in a report submitted to the 
United States Congress.8 At present under ne-
gotiation is the most ambitious project yet: a 
natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western 
Europe that would involve loans to the USSR of 
US$ 10 to US$ 15 billion to cover construction 
costs and the provision of Western technology 
and equipment, in return for the supply of 40 
^Economic Commission for Europe, Joint UNCTC/ 
E C E Unit, A Quantitative Survey of the Development of 
East-West Industrial Co-operation, TRADE/R. 408, 19 
September 1980. 
8
"Eas t European Economies Post-Helsinki", a com-
pendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of the US Congress, US Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, 1977. 
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billion cubic metres of natural gas per year as 
from 1986. The project would increase the per-
centage of USSR gas used in Western Europe 
from 9% to 25% of the region's total consump-
tion.9 
As may be seen, the majority of the com-
pensation agreements thus far have been in the 
energy sector and in the extractive and proces-
sing sector, but the manufacturing sector may 
account for an increasing share in coming 
years, as energy resources become depleted 
and the capital intensity of the sector rises. So-
cialist policy-makers have repeatedly stressed 
their preference for co-operation in sectors in-
volving a high degree of processing, such as 
manufacturing, which also provides the access 
to foreign technology and third markets which 
the socialist countries are particularly interes-
ted in obtaining. Estimates of the number of 
contracts in the manufacturing area are only 
available for Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hunga-
ry, Sweden and Switzerland, and even these 
data are not easily comparable. Still, extrapolat-
ing from Hungarian data, an estimate of 1 000 
contracts can be made for the total of East-West 
agreements in manufacturing.1" The USSR's 
draft plan for 1984-1988 does not seem to indi-
cate very active Soviet participation in agree-
ments of this type however. 
The second type of co-operation is that re-
lated with production and marketing, ranging 
from simple subcontracting to co-production 
and sophisticated specialization. In this type of 
agreement, both parties seek to utilize their 
competit ive advantages, increase the scale of 
operations, use more fully existing capacities 
and ensure adequate market penetration. 
Technical assistance and credits are often in-
cluded, but not risk or profit sharing. Although 
accounting for only 3% of East-West trade, 
agreements of this type cover 9% of East-West 
trade in machinery.1 ' 
Project co-operation, the third type, can 
refer either to joint tendering or tripartite pro-
jects. Joint tendering consists of East-West co-
^Time Magazine, 15 February 1981, page 71. 
1 0Economic Commission for Europe, Joint UNCTC/ 
E C E Unit, A Quantitative..., op. cit. 
n E c o n o m i c Commission for Europe, Joint UNCTC/ 
ECE Unit, East-West..., op. cit. 
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operation for the delivery of plants or produc-
tion lines and the construction of infrastructure 
to a third country; it may also involve risk and 
profit sharing arrangements. Its advantages lie 
in both cost and capacity utilization considera-
tions. Tripartite projects also involve a third 
party, but this party is not merely the recipient 
of goods and services, but an active participant 
which may, for example, execute civil engi-
neer ing works or supply certain kinds of equip-
ment. 
Joint ventures, the fourth type of industrial 
co-operation, involve joint contribution of as-
sets, joint management, and sharing of profits 
and risks according to a previously agreed for-
mula. There are different types of joint ventu-
res in different regions. Those located in East 
European countries are a relatively new phe-
nomenon, and in fact, to date only Hungary, 
Poland and Romania allow a limited form of 
foreign investment. Technology inflows and 
access to Western markets are the primary con-
sideration for the East; Western enterprises see 
joint ventures primarily as a device for penetra-
ting the market of the recipient countries, but 
also as a way of reducing cost. As of mid-1978, 
there were nine joint ventures in Romania, 
three in Hungary and none in Poland. In con-
trast, Yugoslavia had more than 150 contracts, 
with foreign participation amounting to US$ 
400 million. Joint ventures located in the West 
considerably outnumber those in the East: by 
mid-1978 they numbered 239 (excluding banks 
and other financial institutions), established in 
the West by seven socialist countries.12 
Finally, there are alsojointventures estab-
lished in developing countries through triparti-
te arrangements. Their number is small but 
increasing, most of them being in the Maghreb 
and the Near East (over 50%). The percentage 
in Latin America decreased from 10.5% in 
1965-1975 to 5.7% in 1976-1979,13 but the con-
t inued growth of East-West industrial co-ope-
ration, may result in an increase in East-South 
economic relations. The stress put in the East 
on the satisfaction of the basic needs of a rela-
tively poor mass consumer may be of interest to 
nibid. 
1 3Economic Commission for Europe, Joint UNCTC/ 
E C E Unit, A Quantitative..., op. cit. 
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developing countries striving to satisfy their 
peoples ' basic needs by a more even distribu-
tion of their national incomes; and inflows of 
Western technology might in their turn enhan-
ce exports from the East to the South. The deve-
loping countries, for their part, may well find 
that consumers in the East provide a more ac-
Two developments characterize efforts in the 
South towards the internationalization of pro-
duction and marketing: the creation of State 
enterprises with international activities and 
the expansion abroad of Third World private 
firms. Both provide a certain degree of coun-
tervailing power vis-à-vis TNCs and thus con-
tr ibute to the small 'closing of the door' to 
which we referred in the introduction. In this 
section we shall first discuss the general nature 
of these two developments, and then briefly 
survey their development throughout the 
Third World, with particular emphasis on the 
experience in Latin America. 
Third World State-owned enterprises have 
been expanding abroad, but this is not the main 
reason for their establishment. Analysis of the 
reasons why they were set up shows that such 
enterprises can have effects on the internatio-
nalization of production independently of any 
expansion abroad. Modern State enterprises 
have outgrown the public utilities field and 
range over a wide spectrum of roles and activi-
ties. They have been used as fiscal agents, to 
sell at high monopoly prices, by at low monop-
sony prices, or subsidize the sale of basic com-
modities at reduced prices: all functions which 
a ministry could handle, but probably less ef-
ficiently. They have also served to carry out 
n e e d e d activities which the private sector 
could not or would not carry out, or which the 
country did not want foreign-owned companies 
to control. They have been used to improve 
terms of trade by acting as sole agents for the 
country in international trade, or to guard bal-
ance-of-payments equilibrium by representing 
their country in bilateral trade agreements. 
cessible market for their industrial products 
than the more sophisticated consumers in the 
West, and here again, Western technology 
might help the abundant and less expensive 
labour in the South to produce the consumer 
goods which the East is now demanding in 
increasing amounts. 
They have also served as agents of national 
industrial policy, setting up industries in back-
ward areas, helping obsolete industries either 
to survive or die gently, softening both structur-
al and cyclical changes, and limiting price rises 
in sensitive products or services. Numerous 
examples can be provided of enterprises in 
both industrialized and Third World countries 
which carry out these various functions.14 
Some of the probable —but not yet de-
monstrated— international implications of the 
expansion of State-owned enterprises are: a 
greater emphasis on purchases from local sup-
pliers; greater efforts to increase exports, if ne-
cessary by selling at reduced prices; reluctance 
to lay off workers, even in periods of economic 
downturn; a sales policy in which long-term 
national objectives —such as reduced sales of 
non-renewable resources— may outweigh 
short-term profits; reluctance to invest in facili-
ties abroad or to adapt products to foreign tastes 
because of political sensitivities at home; a 
greater propensity to establish links with other 
State-owned enterprises, rather than with 
TNCs; a preference for longer-term agree-
ments and cartelization rather than internatio-
nal vertical integration; and a tendency to seek 
new types of agreements with TNCs, be it to 
reach distant markets, secure sophisticated 
technology, or even to increase their autonomy 
vis-à-vis there own home governments. The 
decisions of these enterprises, it must be kept 
in mind, may be influenced by a number of 
l 4Raymond Vernon, "The International Aspects of Sta-
te-Owned Enterprises", Journal of International Business 




considerations: a board of directors with mem-
bers of different political persuasions and with 
the short tenures characteristic of political life, 
rivalries with government ministers and bu-
reaus for greater independence, and conflicts 
be tween economic and political considera-
tions. 
Latin American State multinationals re-
present the most deliberate effort to acquire 
bargaining power vis-à-vis TNCs through re-
gional joint ventures. They usually operate in 
strategic areas, such as the export of basic com-
modities, the development of transport infras-
tructure or the purchase of strategic inputs. 
Many arise from bilateral arrangements for the 
joint exploitation of natural resources, building 
and operating international pipelines, joint 
administration of railroads and interconnexion 
of electrical systems. By joining forces, the 
partners in the venture can overcome financial 
or marketing barriers to entry into oligopolistic 
sectors or activities where economies of scale 
are significant. Occasionally, some Latin Ame-
rican joint ventures have invited a third firm, 
from an industrialized country, to participate in 
order to provide needed new technology or 
bet ter access to external markets. If such part-
ners are properly selected, all can benefit from 
the arrangements. TNCs have not been slow to 
recognize the opportunities offered by these 
and other novel arrangements. 
A recent study illustrates the increasing 
importance of State enterprises in Latin Ameri-
ca. T h e share of public ownership in the local 
economy of Venezuela reached 60% in 1975, 
whi le it was 32% in Peru (1975) and 35% in 
Brazil (1974). T h e corresponding figures for Ja-
pan (10% in 1960), the United States (15% in 
1960) and the United Kingdom (25% in 1962), 
show the greater importance of State enterpri-
ses in the developing countries. The study also 
identifies important similarities and differen-
ces be tween State enterprises and TNCs. First, 
both have large operations and a high degree of 
monopoly power and leadership in the markets 
in which they operate (in 1970 the government 
share of national investment was 52% in Brazil 
and 35% in Mexico); the investment is concen-
trated in a small number of strategic sectors 
(e.g., in Mexico for 1971-1976, 46% went into 
oil and petrochemicals, 32% into electricity ge-
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neration and 13% into steel); the absolute value 
of the investments is often comparable to those 
of TNCs (PEMEX plans to invest US$ 15 bil-
lion in 1977-1982). Secondly, both State enter-
prises and TNCs tend to participate in relativ-
ely high-technology dynamic sectors, where 
mere ownership is not enough to guarantee 
control. A large percentage of the goods and 
services involved in the State enterprise in-
vestment must be imported (60% in the case of 
PEMEX, 80 to 90% in relatively less developed 
countries), which often means that total TNC 
business through the sale of specialized goods 
and services can match or even exceed the co-
rresponding figures for all wholly-owned fore-
ign subsidiaries in the remaining industrial 
sector (so that these figures could, therefore, 
grossly underestimate the extent of TNC invol-
vement). The ad hoc nature of the negotiations 
and agreements between State enterprises and 
TNCs represents a field where much research 
is needed.1 5 
Latin American integration efforts have 
thus far had only a marginal effect in promoting 
intra-regional joint ventures. Evidence seems 
to show that TNCs have been the main benefi-
ciaries of integration to date.16 SELA seems to 
be succeeding in setting up a few joint ventures 
through decentralized 'action committees' in 
various countries, with strong tutelage or par-
ticipation by the public sector. 
In general, the main motivation behind the 
expansion abroad of Third World firms has 
much in common with certain basic motiva-
tions of TNCs: the search for new markets and 
for assured sources of raw materials. Third 
World firms, however, may have more specific 
motives: in countries with strict controls of fo-
reign exchange, expansion abroad provides a 
practical way to accumulate needed foreign ex-
change in other countries; in countries with 
small markets, or in those which restrict growth 
to certain permissible levels of production, it 
may be the only way to continued growth. De-
creased risk from diversification across bor-
i^Constantine Vaitsos, State Enterprises and Transna-
tional in Latin America, United Nations, Centre on 
Transnational Corporations (forthcoming). 
i6United Nations, Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions, "Regional Integration and the Bargaining Capacity of 
Developing Countries", New York, 1980. 
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ders , and preservation of export markets threa-
tened by protective measures to foster local 
production, may also be strong incentives. 
E thnic reasons may also play a role in certain 
cases. 
What characteristics of these Third World 
firms allow them to compete with the much 
larger transnational corporations? Third World 
firms thrive in industries or segments of the 
market where cost of production is high and 
economies of scale are not so significant as to 
prec lude small scale operations; TNCs prefer 
to produce goods in which their oligopolistic 
position prevents over-intense price competi-
tion. Third World firms are also more amenable 
to enter ing foreign markets by setting up joint 
ventures with local partners, either because of 
their greater awareness of local political sensi-
tivities or because of home country restrictions 
on the export of capital. In addition, frequently 
subsidiaries of Third World firms soon start 
operat ing on their own, and do not maintain the 
close ties to headquarters that make TNC sub-
sidiaries permanent agents of a global strategy. 
Superior ability to adapt technology to small-
scale production and to transmit the acquired 
experience, faster investment decisions, and 
the ability to save on management and engine-
er ing personnel costs are also frequently men-
t ioned as likely advantages of Third World 
firms. The reduced asymmetry between inves-
tor and host country, the greater receptivity to 
local participation in the ventures, and the les-
ser emphasis on global optimization, however, 
seem to be the key to their current expansion 
abroad.17 
Before turning to a survey of the existing 
situation, it must be noted that statistics on this 
subjects are hard to come by. Few countries 
disaggregate their investment figures to this 
level, be it as host countries or as home coun-
tries, and even when available these figures 
underest imate the investment, for local part-
ners usually supply a major portion of the capi-
tal. In a'ddition, investment figures usually do 
not provide information about the real source of 
17Louis T. Wells Jr. "The Internationalization of Firms 
from Developing Countries", in Tamir Agmon and C.P. 
Kindleberger (eds.) Multinationals from Small Countries, 
Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1977. 
the investment: funds apparently coming from 
a developing country may really be coming 
from the subsidiary of a transnational corpora-
tion in that country. Tax heavens may also pro-
duce distortions. Some representative figures, 
nevertheless, may be useful: 
(a) In Indonesia, if mining and petroleum 
are omitted, Hong Kong is second only to Japan 
as foreign investor, Philippines is third, Singa-
pore seventh and Korea eighth, while Asian 
developing country investors together stand 
above Japanese, North American or European 
investors. Of 360 firms granted promotion sta-
tus in Thailand between 1966 and 1973, 93 
were from Taiwan, 16 from Singapore, 15 from 
India, 10 from Malaysia and 5 from Hong Kong; 
36 listed in the 'others' category were probably 
mostly from developing countries too. In the 
Phil ippines, Chinese investors. accounted for 
413 million of the 2 829 million pesos of foreign 
investment approved between 1968 and 
1974.18 
(b) India has 110 joint enterprises operat-
ing in over 35 countries, and 87 in various sta-
ges of implementation. Main host countries are 
Malaysia (36), Indonesia (18), United Arab 
Emirates (17), Kenya (14), Nigeria (12), United 
States (10), and United Kingdom (6). The main 
activities of these enterprises in developing 
countries are in engineering products, capital 
goods and shipping, while in developed coun-
tries they are in hotels, restaurants and food 
processing, although there are also a few manu-
facturing enterprises.19 
(c) Seventeen out of 29 foreign-owned 
companies in textiles and related fields in Ni-
geria have owners from other developing coun-
tries; the same is true of 3 out of 6 companies in 
cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery, 4 out 
of 10 in structural metal products, 4 out of 7 in 
furniture and fixtures and 4 out of 4 in miscella-
neous chemical products.20 
nibid. 
19Ram Gopal Agrawal, "Third World Multinationals: 
Indian Experience", paper presented to Seminar on Third 
World Multinational Corporations, East-West Center, Ho-
nolulu, September 1979. 
20C.N.S. Hambudiri, O. Iyanda, D.M. Akinnusi, 
"Third World Country Firms in Third World Developing 
Countries; The Nigerian Expecience", paper presented at 
the same seminar mentioned in footnote 19. 
58 
(d) South Korea has 150 international 
firms operating in 44 countries, 77% of them in 
developing countries. Korean private invest-
ment abroad increased from US$ 64 million 
(103 cases) in 1976 to US$ 150 million (245 
cases) in 1978. Nearly 50 South Korean cons-
truction companies are operating in 25 devel-
oping countries: in the Middle East alone there 
were 30 companies with over 60 000 workers 
and US$ 8 million worth of contracts in 1979.21 
As regards Latin America, the statistics for 
nine countries (see table 1) show that intra-re-
gional direct foreign investment amounted to 
about US$ 350 million at the end of the 1970s: 
somewhat over 1% of total direct foreign invest-
ment in the region. Many of the countries are 
both sources and recipients of such investment. 
As sources, Argentina is first in Brazil and sec-
ond in Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela; Brazil 
is first in Bolivia and Chile; Venezuela is first in 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru; Chile is first in 
Ecuador; Uruguay is second in Brazil and Peru, 
and Colombia is first in Argentina. Overall, Ar-
gentina and Brazil are the main source coun-
tries. Mexico is probably also an important 
source, but statistics for Central America, 
where most Mexican investment occurs, are 
2 lKyung-Il Ghymn, "Multinational Enterprises from 
Third World", presented at the above seminar (see footnote 
19). 
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not available and in South America Mexican 
investment is not significant. The less devel-
oped countries, as might be expected do not 
have large investments abroad. As recipients, 
both Argentina and Brazil are important, but 
so are some less developed countries such 
as Ecuador. Geographical proximity has a de-
cided influence: 36% of Colombian investment 
is in the Andean region and Panama, 30% of 
Argentinian investment is in Brazil and 30% in 
Uruguay; 50% of Chilean investment is in Ar-
gentina, Ecuador and Peru. Manufacturing in-
vestments clearly predominate, and joint ven-
tures with local partners constitute the pre-
ferred modality. Other data show that the rate 
of growth of intra-regional investment in the 
last ten years has been significant.22 
As we look at all these figures, however, 
their low absolute value must not be forgotten. 
With few exceptions, the international activi-
ties of Third World enterprises, by world stan-
dards, are still embryonic. To pretend otherwi-
se might put them in an unequal struggle with 
small chances of survival. 
2 2 Eduardo White, Latin American Joint Ventures: A 
New Way to Strengthen the Bargaining Power of Develo-
ping Countries vis-à-vis Transnational Corporations, Uni-
ted Nations, Centre on Transnational Corporations (forth-
coming). 
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Table 1 
INTRA-REGIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 




























American countries — 
Total 60 682 
Source and notes: 





































































































































¿Investments declared up to August 1976. Data supplied by the Departament of Foreign Investments of the Ministry of the 
Economy. No data available for the period 1 September 1976 to 1 March 1977. A total of US$ 27 426 000 was approved 
from September 1976 to September 1979 (Brazil 20 632 000, Uruguay 4 917 000, Venezuela 829 000, Costa Rica 848 000, 
Guatemala 200 000). 
b Direc t foreign investment approved by the Industrial Promotion Agency (INI) between 1972 and 1976. Covers only part 
of the investment in the industrial sector. 
^'Bulletin of the Central Bank of Brazil, December 1978. 
^Foreign Exchange Office, Banco de la República. Does not include investments in the oil industry. 
e Fore ign Investments Committee, period from 1974 to 11 August 1978. 
fCentral Bank of Ecuador, Balance of Payments Unit. Direct research on accumulated investment. 
^Depar tment of Foreign Investments and Transfer of Technology: "Sociedades mexicanas con participación de capital de 
países de la ALALC". Calculated at an exchange rate of 22.767 pesos per dollar, corresponding to the average for 1978. 
' 'CONITE - Ministry of the Economy and Finance. Calculated at an exchange rate of 83.81 soles per dollar corresponding 
to the average for 1977 (IMF, International Financial Statistics). 




What guidance can developing countries de-
rive from this survey of recent developments in 
the East and South? This question is hard to 
answer without knowing what orientation de-
veloping countries want, and this in turn re-
quires that the countries define what kind of 
development they want: economic system, in-
come distribution, consumption patterns, in-
dustrialization goals, food and energy policies, 
desired level of national and collective self-re-
liance, degree of reliance on foreign invest-
ment and loans and on foreign markets. In the 
light of these objectives they will then have to 
decide the goods and services they need, 
whether to import them or produce them, and 
in the latter case, whether to set up a national 
enterprise or rely on a subsidiary of a transna-
tional corporation. If the decision is to call in a 
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TNC, then the desired arrangement with it will 
have to be decided, since many new modalities 
have recently been developed, 
The importance of clear objectives and 
strategies cannot be overemphasized. As the 
Cheshire cat told Alice: if you don't know 
where you want to get, it doesn't much matter 
which way you go. But answers to the questions 
raised in the previous paragraph call for diffi-
cult choices between short-term and long-term 
objectives and between national and regional 
development plans. It is often difficult for a 
poor country to sacrifice present consumption 
for the sake of future generations, and yet his-
tory shows that unless a country invests in its 
future, it will fall behind. It is also difficult to 
persuade the people of a country that regional 
development may be more to their advantage 
than the installation of a particular project in 
their country, yet modern production methods 
require much larger economic units than those 
provided by most develoling countries. The 
transnational corporations, with which the de-
veloping countries have to negotiate many as-
pects of their development plans, know exactly 
what they want Likewise, agreed objectives 
and regional solidarity seem to be the surest 
ways to strengthen the bargaining capacity of 
developing countries, particularly the smaller 
and less advanced ones. But even if a country 
decides to go its own way, clear awareness of its 
goals and its options is essential. The first step 
to development is knowing what you want. 
Since every developing country has its 
own objectives we shall postulate a set of these 
in order to derive some conclusions from our 
survey; other objectives could, of course, lead 
to different conclusions. Following the lead of 
a distinguished Third World scholar,23 let us 
assume the following scenario. A change in in-
ternational structures is coming. The future 
markets and labour surplus lie in the South and 
the underutilized capital which the North con-
tinues to amass needs to reckon with this reali-
ty. National orders within the Third World 
adapt to the needs of their own peoples, led by 
pressure from their explosively growing cities 
and an intensive process of internal migration. 
23Mahbub ul Haq, "Negotiating the Future", Foreign 
Affairs, Washington, Winter 1980, Vol. 59, No. 2. 
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Major changes in life-styles and industrial and 
trade patterns occur in the industrialized coun-
tries as rising energy costs cut into their compa-
rative advantage in energy-intensive agricultu-
re and industry. Third World countries strive 
for balanced development of their agriculture 
(including self-sufficiency in basic foods) and 
their industry (including national and collecti-
ve self-reliance), with a view to greater internal 
equity within nations and external equity 
among the countries and regions of the world. 
In this context, it seems that the growth of 
East-West industrial co-operation and the in-
ternational expansion of Third World State and 
private firms surveyed in this article, although 
still embryonic, have solid roots and will acqui-
re increasing significance. The sharp bounda-
ries between an expansive industrial West, a 
hermetic East and a passive South, mere provi-
der of raw materials and markets to the West, 
will blur as it becomes evident that effective 
and mutually beneficial co-operation can exist 
between countries with different economic 
systems and different levels of development. 
Transnational corporations have shown surpri-
sing adaptability to co-operate with countries 
with planned and regulated economies where 
only non-equity forms of participation are open 
to them. They have also shown ability to res-
pond to Third World demands for greater con-
trol over TNC subsidiaries, greater linkages 
between the subsidiaries and the local econo-
my, and growing accomodation between TNC 
activities and those of Third World State and 
private enterprises. The variety of business 
arrangements developed testify to this flexibi-
lity: joint ventures, with varying degrees of 
sharing of risks and benefits, control and de-
cision-making; special contractual agreements, 
where the TNC bears all the risks and the share 
of benefits is determined by negotiation; tech-
nology, management and marketing arrange-
ments, where the domestic enterprise owns the 
venture, bears all the risks and gains all the 
profit, with payment to the TNC according to 
an agreed formula; and subcontracting, co-pro-
duction and specialization agreements, where 
long-term relationships in production and mar-
keting exist, but there is no sharing of control 
decision-making, risks or profits. 
In the same context, it is clear that the 
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South can profit from the experience of the East 
in their dealing with TNCs. Much of the East's 
success in negotiations derives from clear eco-
nomic and development policies, unified bar-
gaining —be it for the setting up of plants or for 
the sale or purchase of goods— and a strong 
administrative infrastructure. The ability to 
' unbund le ' the package offered by TNCs and to 
bargain only for the really needed items is ano-
ther area where developing countries can study 
with profit the experience of the East. The abi-
lity to effectively monitor the implementation 
of agreements is another such area. In the insti-
tutional aspect, the experience of the East with 
State enterprises, even though carried out in 
different economic and political settings from 
those existing in most countries of the South, 
may still be of interest. This may be even truer 
of the socialist efforts to develop international 
enterprise organizations and socialist joint en-
terprises and the potential lessons to be learnt 
from these examples in respect of multinational 
enterprises such as those the Andean Pact and 
SELA have been promoting. 
The main lesson that the South can learn 
from the East, however, does not refer to speci-
fic modalities or institutions. The situations are 
too different to permit copying or imitation. 
The really important lesson is that regarding 
the potential of a region to plan its own way of 
doing things and satisfying its needs, and of 
successfully bargaining with other regions for 
an equitable distribution of the world's resour-
ces and production. 
